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NOTES
Minimum Wage Legislation in Developing
Countries
Zimbabwe: A Case in Point
by Sue A. Fauber*
I. INTRODUCTIONO N JULY 1, 1980, the Minimum Wages Bill became effective as law in
Zimbabwe.' As Zimbabwe is an industrially underdeveloped nation,"
this labor legislation caused concern because of the general belief that
such measures are not effective without a developed industrial base. Par-
liament's hopes and fears were expressed in heated debates when the Bill
was introduced.$ This note surveys the events which created the impetus
for the legislation and the ideologies which supported and opposed it, and
reviews the complete texts of the Minimum Wages Act and the Minimum
Wages (Specification of Minimum Wages) Notice (See Appendices A and
B, respectively). The economic trends which have surfaced since the Act
was passed are examined in an effort to determine what, if any, causal
relationship exists. Careful consideration is also given to the influence of
the international environment on Zimbabwe's domestic economic activity.
An analysis of these interdependent processes provides insight into the
possibility of dealing effectively with economic problems through direct
governmental intervention in developing countries.
II. HISTORY
Prior to November 11, 1965, Rhodesia was a British Colony. While its
native population was black, it had been settled and governed by a mi-
nority of whites lead by Ian Smith. Like other British Colonies in Africa
during that time period, white rule was meeting with substantial opposi-
tion from the black majority. In an effort to forestall any transfer of
*Case Western Reserve University School of Law, J.D. candidate (1982).
Government Gazette, July 1, 1980 at 1.
2 1 PARL. DEB. (No. 18) 874 (Zimbabwe 1980).
3 See, e.g. 1 PARL. DEs. (No. 18) 862, 874, 880, 933 (Zimbabwe 1980).
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power to the black majority, on that date, Smith proclaimed a unilateral
declaration of independence (UDI).4
Subsequently, Britain beseeched U.N. member nations to join it in
imposing economic sanctions upon Rhodesia by cutting off foreign aid
and trade.' To survive economically, the white minority revitalized an al-
ready pervasive policy of exploiting the lowest rungs of the working class,
a group which was almost entirely composed of blacks.6 This pattern, to-
gether with the oppressive social structure it produced, eventually lead
blacks to rise up in opposition. A bitter racial war broke out in late 1972
and early 1973.1 After seven years, the war culminated in the relinquish-
ment of power by popular vote of the white minority and the institution
of black majority rule.8 At midnight on May 31, 1979, the new majority
rule constitution took effect.9
The new Government assumed control of a hungry e nation, ravaged
by war" and victimized by external as well as internal economic pres-
sures."2 Zimbabweans, who had sacrificed so much for self-determination,
waited expectantly for relief. s Their leaders, although anxious to comply,
faced many obstacles.
A. Hunger
Maize is the main component of the Zimbabwean diet. During the
war, many farms were abandoned or destroyed" resulting in a decline in
maize production. Beginning in 1974, the Government suppressed maize
prices in an effort to combat increasing malnutrition. 5 The result, how-
ever, was that maize became such an unprofitable crop"6 that many
farmers turned to tobacco instead. Subsequent maize production declined
by 40 percent.17 Drought added to this dilemma.18 The maize shortage,
4 See The Times (London), Nov. 12, 1965, at 8, col. 107.
5 See generally U.N. CHARTER art. 41; The Times (London), Nov. 13, at 8 col. 5.
6 1 PARL. DEB. (No. 16) 739-40 (Zimbabwe 1980).
7 See The Times (London), Dec. 30, 1972, at 6. col. 1; The Times (London) Jan. 10,
1973, at 1, col. 1.
I The Daily Telegraph, Jan. 30, 1979 at 4, col. 5.
9 The Daily Telegraph, May 31, 1979, at 4, col. 3.
10 The Times (London), Mar. 31, 1980, at 8, col. 5.
Id.
Id. at col. 7, see also U.N. Charter, supra note 5.
See 1 PARL. DEB. (No. 18) 865, 888 (Zimbabwe 1980); The Times (London), Mar. 13,
1980, at 8, col. 7; The Times (London), Mar. 20, 1980, at 8, col. 2; The times (London), Apr.
29, 1980, at 8, col. 1; The Times (London), May 15, 1980, at 8, col. 5.
14' The Times (London), Mar. 13, 1980, at 23, col. 6.
15 The Times (London), June 12, 1980, at 8, col. 3.
Is Id.
17 Id.
18 1 PARL. DEB. (No. 18) 881 (Zimbabwe 1980).
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along with a wartime increase in theft, contributed to a shortage in beef. 9
These shortages gave rise to increased malnutrition, especially in the
rural areas.20
B. The Residue of War
As a direct result of the war, 27,500 people died, 275,000 were in-
jured, 750,000 were displaced, 225,000 remained in protective villages and
330,000 homes were destroyed.2 Medical services, which had been under
considerable strain during the war, were near collapse."2 The white minor-
ity Government had borrowed heavily in order to conduct the war and
left Zimbabwe deeply in debt.2
C. Crisis in Industry
Factory workers in Salisbury and Bulawayo had been on strike due
to racial tensions and low pay.2 After calling on their new Government to
raise wages, they were urged to look to their unions for relief.2 5 But the
trade unions were in a shambles.2 They had been accused of defrauding
and misrepresenting their members and were unable to deal with the
problem effectively.2 7 Consequently, the strikes strengthened and contin-
ued causing disruptions in the sugar and mining industries.2 '
Meanwhile the agricultural industry was $200,000,000 in debt.29 Un-
stable economic conditions were forcing Zimbabwe's largest employer, the
tobacco industry out of business.8 0 Suppliers would no longer accept
credit and few loans were available.8 The tobacco industry alone was fac-
ing an estimated annual loss of $25,000,000.82
Unemployment, estimated to be over 25 percent, 8 was expected to
19 See generally The Times (London), Oct. 16, 1980, at 6, col. 2.
20 The Times (London), Dec. 23, 1979, at 7, col. 1.
"' The Times, supra note 10.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 The Times (London), Mar. 19, 1980, at 8, col. 7.
'5 The Times (London), May 5, 1980, at 1, col. 1.
20 1 PARL. DEB. (No. 17) 797 (Zimbabwe 1980).
27 1 PARL. DEB. (No. 17) 935 (Zimbabwe 1980).
28 The Times (London), Nov. 15, 1980, at 5, col. 2.
39 1 PARL. DEB. (No. 18) 866 (Zimbabwe 1980).
30 See generally The Times, supra note 15.
3' 1 Parl. Deb. (No. 18) 881-2 (Zimbabwe 1980).
22 1 Parl. Deb. (No. 18) 925 (Zimbabwe 1980).
3 Measuring unemployment in underdeveloped countries is difficult because sensitive
to arbitrary differences in the measuring process. This figure is little more than a guess. See
Doctor and Gallis, 93 INT'L LAB. REV. 2 (Feb. 1966).
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worsen. Half of the population was under 15 years of age."' And, due to
the war, most of those young people had missed years of education.8"
Large numbers of them were certain to enter the ranks of the unem-
ployed with guerrillas who were left jobless upon cease-fire.86 The war
distorted the structure of the labor force; it was bloated with the young,
the uneducated, and the unskilled. There was no room in industry for this
surplus labor supply.
D. Crisis of Expectation
The establishment of majority rule created a post-independence
crisis of expectation.8 7 Zimbabweans had long struggled under the social
and economic burdens of oppression and poverty. The new Government
promised change as it came to power. The future Finance Minister prom-
ised a radical realignment of the economy and redistribution of wealth to
help the poor.3 8 The Prime Minister vowed that racial discrimination and
exploitation would no longer be tolerated.89 President Canaan Banana
promised that everything possible would be done to improve the econ-
omy, wages, and working conditions.' 0 The citizens of Zimbabwe expected
relief and were impatient for results. If the new Government of Zimbabwe
failed to respond quickly and make good its promises, it was sure to face
a crisis. 41
E. Summary
In short, Zimbabwe was a troubled nation. Its people were suffering
both physically and economically. Yet, the nation's needs were great.
With the odds pitted against them, the Zimbabwean Parliament prepared
to meet those needs.
III. THE MINIMUM WAGES ACT
The Minister of Labour & Social Services, Mr. Kumbirai Kangai, in-
troduced the Minimum Wages Bill on June 12, 1980.42 The resulting Min-
imum Wages Act and Minimum Wages (Specification of Minimum
Wages) Notice, 1980, are reproduced in their entirety in Appendices A
', 1 Parl. Deb. (No. 18) 875 (Zimbabwe 1980).
" See The Times, supra note 10.
88 The Times (London), July 6, 1980, at 10, col. 8.
37 1 PARL, Dma. (No. 18) 865, 888 (Zimbabwe 1980).
88 The Times (London), Mar. 13, 1980, at 8, col. 7.
9 See The Times (London), Apr. 29, 1980, at 8, col. 1.
40 The Times (London), May 15, 1980, at 8, col. 5.
41 The Times (London), Mar. 20, 1980, at 8, col. 2.
41 1 Parl. Deb. (No. 16) 715 (Zimbabwe 1980).
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and B, respectively. The following is a summary of the Act's significant
features.
The Act gives the Minister of Labour & Social Services power to ad-
minister and enforce its provisions." In so doing, he may appoint boards
to make recommendations and conduct investigations. Such appoint-
ments may be made either by the Minister, or at the request of the em-
ployer functioning as the employee's representative."
The class of employees who need not receive the minimum wage in-
cludes: independent contractors, piece-work employees, and the physi-
cally or mentally handicapped." The Act prohibits discrimination in the
payment of wages on the grounds of race, sex, or age across all grades of
employment."1 It voids any contracts in conflict with its mandate.47 De-
ductions from the minimum wage may be made only if provided for in
the express language of enactment, or if attributable to unauthorized
leave, written stop-orders, repayment of loans, authorized legal deduc-
tions, payments made in error amounts owing for goods supplied or ser-
vices rendered (with consent of the employee). '"
The Act provides that part-time employees be paid a specified frac-
tion of the salary of full-time employees during the time in which they
are engaged in regular part-time work.49 Contravention of the Act's provi-
sions is deemed an offense and the offending employer may be liable for
penalties of a fine up to $1,000 or imprisonment. Damages may also be
recovered from the employer. 50
Termination of employment based solely on grounds of the require-
ment to pay minimum wages are forbidden. 1 However, the Minister has
the power to grant an exemption under special circumstances, although
what constitutes special circumstances is not enunciated."s The payment
of wages in kind is prohibited. The Act prevents the withdrawal, reduc-
tion, or alteration of benefits in effect prior to its enactment.8
The Act also provides for notice through the government's official
newspaper, the Gazette, as to the schedule of wages and employees cov-
ered.5' The schedule in effect at the time of this writing called for a two-
4' Minimum Wages Act, § 3 (1980) reprinted in Appendix A.
44 Id. at § 4.
45 Minimum Wages Notice §§ 2, 3 (1980) reprinted in Appendix B.
46 Id. at § 7 & Minimum Wages Act, § 8 (1980) reprinted in Appendix B.
'7 Minimum Wages Act, § 5(b)-(c) (1980) reprinted in Appendix A.
,8 Minimum Wages Notice, § 5 (1980) reprinted in Appendix B.
" Id. at § 4(2).
5o Minimum Wages Act, §§ 6(1)-(2), 8(2) (1980) reprinted in Appendix A.
Id. at § 7(1).
Id. at § 7(2).
" Minimum Wages Notice, § 4(4) (1980) reprinted in Appendix B.
54 Minimum Wages Act, § 3(2) (1980) reprinted in Appendix A.
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phase introduction. The first schedule of wages would be in effect from
July 1, 1980, to January 1, 1981. The second schedule of wages would be
effective from January 1, 1981, to July 1, 1981. 65 The classes of covered
employees include: public and private domestic employees, agricultural
employees, mining employees, sugar-production employees, saw-milling
employees, persons primarily employed within a rural council area, mu-
nicipality, town, or local government area, and persons to whom any in-
dustrial enactment (or certain specific governmental regulations) ap-
plies." The minimum wage for the classes ranges from a low of $30 per
month to a high of $85 per month.5 7
The Minimum Wages Bill was enunciated a second time on June 13,
1980,8 and Kangai included a few explanatory remarks. Apologizing for
the fact that the Bill had been made public prior to its reading in Parlia-
ment, Kangai explained that because of labor unrest, the workers were
given an early indication of the Government's intentions." He further
stated that "because of (that) action the spread of strikes (had) been
stemmed."eo
Kangai acknowledged the existence of arguments against the Bill but
suggested that they be reconsidered in light of the public's raised expec-
tations and its unwillingness to accept excuses. 61 He bluntly stated that
the Government had an obligation to end exploitation,' 42 and proceeded to
explain how the Bill was designed to meet that obligation.
Noting that higher wages were being proposed for persons employed
in urban areas, Kangai reasoned that because urban workers generally re-
ceived very few benefits in kind and therefore have been most immedi-
ately affected by increases in the cost of living they deserve a higher mini-
mum than agricultural or domestic workers who often received benefits in
kind such as room and board.'8 While admitting that the agricultural in-
dustry was in poor condition, Kangai insisted that because it employed
the largest number of employees for the least amount of pay, an exemp-
tion could not be justified." Characterizing the problem of domestic
workers as complex, 5 Kangai again insisted that an exemption would be
55 Minimum Wages Notice, Schedule (1980) reprinted in Appendix B.
56 Id.
57 Id.
8 1 PARL. DEB. (No. 17) 795 (Zimbabwe 1980).
59 Id.
60 Id.
a1 1 PARL. DEB. (No. 17) 795-796 (Zimbabwe 1980).
as Id.
68 1 PARL. DEB. (No. 17) 797-798 (Zimbabwe 1980).
", See 1 PARL. DEB. (No. 17) 799 (Zimbabwe 1986).
61 Id. at 800.
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difficult to justify."6 He suggested that a committee should be established
to balance conditions of service and wages to align domestic workers with
agricultural workers.
6 7
Kangai noted the penalty provisions with regret but insisted that
they were necessary in order to prevent mass retrenchment, as well as to
further the spirit of the Bill." He also called attention to the provisions
which would allow exemptions under special circumstances.09
After Kangai made his final remarks, it was decided that debate be
delayed to give the members of Parliament more time to digest and eval-
uate the Bill.70 Debate was scheduled to take place on June 17, 1980.1 It
was expected that the Bill would be accepted or rejected on that date.7 2
IV. THE PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE
When Parliament convened on June 17, 1980, at two o'clock in the
afternoon, Kangai's motion that Standing Order No. 21, which requires
automatic adjournment at seven o'clock, be suspended was passed . 7 The
motion's purpose was to ensure that the Minimum Wages Bill would be
passed by the House adjournment. It was hoped that this would allow
extra time for the necessary preparations so that the Bill, if passed, could
take effect on July 1, 1980.74 This motion foreshadowed the events that
would be forthcoming as the ensuing debates were lengthy and emotional.
For purposes of clarity, the arguments for and against the Minimum
Wages Bill have been classified according to premise. This Note does not
profess to be an exhaustive treatment of the pros and cons of minimum
wage legislation. Rather it expresses only the most significant concerns
expressed by the Parliament of Zimbabwe.
A. Adverse Effects
The main objection voiced by the Members of Parliament was that
the Act would not only fail to accomplish its intended purpose, but that it
would create other, insurmountable, adverse effects. According to one
classical economic theory, in labor-intensive industries like the majority
of those found in Zimbabwe, it is generally accepted that every increase
in wages without a corresponding rise in productivity will precipitate an
" Id.
67 Id.
6 1 PARL. DEB. (No. 17) 801 (Zimbabwe 1980).
69 Id.
70 Id. at 801-802.
71 1 PARL. DEB. (No. 17) 804 (Zimbabwe 1980).
72 Id.
13 1 PARL. DEB. (No. 17) (Zimbabwe 1980).
74 Id.
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increase in unemployment.7 5 This is especially applicable in underdevel-
oped countries." If the industry has a low capital-to-labor ratio, as does
the agriculture industry for example, the classical theory is more applica-
ble.7" When the industry takes the opportunity to pass the increased costs
of labor onto the consumer in the form of product prices, a resulting de-
cline in demand will cause production to be curtailed and unemployment
to increase.7 s Also, in agriculture, when the cost of production increases
with the cost of labor, profits decline substantially.70
These principles of economic theory provide the bases for much of
the criticism to which the Minimum Wages Bill was subject. However,
although the principles are helpful in assessing the capabilities of eco-
nomic legislation, they are not absolute. Even in labor-intensive indus-
tries it is possible to raise wages while leaving the level of employment
unchanged. 0 Because profit can provide a cushion against unemployment
and a rise in productivity can compensate for higher labor costs, there is a
narrow range within which wage increases are economically sound.6 1
Whether or not the wage increase that the Minimum Wages Act would
effect lies within that range was a topic of much controversy in Parlia-
ment. The following is a summary which characterizes the major criti-
cisms of the Bill which were expressed during the debate.
1. The Destruction of Industry
Because the Minimum Wages Bill would undoubtedly translate into
higher labor costs for industry, it was believed that the increased cost
burden would force employers with precarious financial bases to declare
bankruptcy.821 The agriculture industry, as previously described, was
heavily in debt and expecting more losses.6 6 The tobacco industry was
already threatened with collapse. 8 ' It was contended that with the price
of tobacco plummetting, the industry could not be expected to withstand
an increase in the cost of labor.85 Bankruptcy was inevitable if the Gov-
ernment set the minimum wage arbitrarily and without regard to a given
76 A. Rees, THE ECONOMICS OF WORK AND PAY, 66-72 (1973).
76 See Neely, Why Wage-Price Controls Fail: A "Theory of the Second Best" Approach
to Inflation Control, 79 W. VA. L. REv. 1, 9 (1976).
7 Id. at 13-14.
76 Id. at 14.
"' Id. at 19.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 1 PARL. DEB. (No. 18) 897 (Zimbabwe 1980).
83 1 PARL. DEB., supra note 29.
84 The Times, supra notes 30-32.
88 1 PARL. DEB., supra note 82.
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industry's ability to pay." The success or failure of the agriculture indus-
try was inextricably linked not only with Zimbabwe's economy due to the
percentage of the population it employed, but also with the nation's very
survival as indicated by the widespread existence of malnutrition and
outright starvation. 87 The impact of collapse in the agricultural sector
would be devastating.
The nature of manufacturing industries would enable them to pass
the increased cost of labor onto the consumer. This opportunity to allo-
cate increased labor costs was not possible in service industries, such as
those employing domestic workers.8 ' Such a disparate situation created
two problems; it arbitrarily discriminated against the service industry,8'
and it placed a burden on the Zimbabwean consumer and the
Zimbabwean exporter. The consumer was already suffering, and rising
prices would make Zimbabwean export goods less competitive in the
world market."°
It was also argued that Zimbabwe was too underdeveloped to risk the
introduction of a minimum wage because high labor costs would create a
disincentive for investment and inhibit further industrial growth." In a
meeting of Parliament, prior to the passage of the minimum wage legisla-
tion, the Minister of Commerce and Industry had pointed out that profits
are what an entrepreneur achieves for successful capital investment and
suggested that anything which threatens profits would naturally threaten
investment.9" Arguing that a minimum wage would stifle speculation in
development projects in Zimbabwe, one member of Parliament, Mr. God-
dard, stated that "[W]e have unsophisticated people in this country and
wherever in the world you have unsophisticated people, you have cheap
labor, and that means development. '" 8 If the minimum wage could de-
stroy existing industry and discourage the development of new industries,
it could seriously damage Zimbabwe's fragile economy. Industrial collapse
would also contribute to the already prevalent problem of unemployment.
2. Unemployment
It was contended that the Minimum Wages Bill would create unem-
ployment." Governmentally enforced increases in labor costs cut into
" Id.
87 1 PARL. DEB. (No. 18) 928 (Zimbabwe 1980).
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 1 PARL. DEB. (No. 18) 920 (Zimbabwe 1980).
92 1 PARL. DEB. (No. 16) 717 (Zimbabwe 1980).
3 1 PARL. DEB., supra note 91.
94 1 PARL. DEB. (No. 18) 874-875 (Zimbabwe 1980).
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profits, thus the minimum wage would create an incentive for the em-
ployer to trim the labor budget by other means, namely termination."
Although the Bill expressly forbids terminations effected solely for the
purpose of avoiding payment of the Minimum Wage," presumedly legiti-
mate terminations would not be prohibited. Terminations would arise
from legitimate changes in production or production schedules. Thus,
such changes would be subject to the employer's discretion and any chal-
lenge would be difficult to sustain.
It was also contended that the Act would discourage liberal hiring
practices.97 Employers facing the termination sanctions enforceable by
court action would become very conservative in their hiring practices."8
One member of Parliament said he foresaw "most firms in the country
being very, very selective in the future in whom they engage, and on what
terms and conditions they engage them." 9
The argument was made that the provisions of the Act could be
abused. It was feared that employers would let the minimum wage func-
tion as a maximum wage and hand out raises and promotions begrudg-
ingly.100 Also of concern was the question of whether the employers would
lower wages to the minimum where higher wages had previously been ne-
gotiated 01 to reduce labor costs without being exposed to legal liability
under the Act's termination sanctions. The language of §§ 5(b) and (c) is
general and unclear on this point.10 2
The most vigorously argued objection was that § 8 of the Minimum
Wages Act, which prohibits discrimination in the payment of wages on
grounds of race, sex, or age, would effect massive unemployment among
women and juveniles.108 Women and juveniles, due to their physical limi-
tations, would be far less employable than their adult, male counterparts
because much of the available employment entails manual labor. Com-
bine a competitive labor market with industry's conviction that its first
duty is to the head of the family, usually the adult male laborer,0 4 and
the result is not only unemployed women and juveniles, but underem-
ployed adult males as well. 105 Within a culture where women have the
95 1 PARL. DEB. (No. 18) 893 (Zimbabwe 1980).
Minimum Wages Act, § 7(1) (1980) reprinted in Appendix A.
97 1 PARL. DEB. (No. 18) 907 (Zimbabwe 1980).
96 Id.
99 Id.
100 1 PARL. DEB. (No. 18) 937 (Zimbabwe 1980).
101 Id.
'0 Minimum Wages Act § 5 (b)(c) (1980) reprinted in Appendix A.
'0 1 PARL. DEB. (No. 18) 868-869 (Zimbabwe 1980).
'0' 1 PARL. DEB. (No. 17) 798 (Zimbabwe 1980) and 1 PARL. DEB. (No. 18) 900-901
(Zimbabwe 1980).
100 1 PARL. DEB. (No. 18) 880 (Zimbabwe 1980).
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sole responsibility of bearing and rearing the children along with main-
taining the home, it is difficult for them to compete with their adult, male
counterparts.'"
Lastly, it was argued that the minimum wage would do nothing more
than turn the worker into a commodity and ". .. [I]f the worker, as a
commodity is to be priced out of the market, he will be replaced by ma-
chines. 10 7 Automation was not widely desired, apparently because of the
belief that while it provided the employer with a method for maintaining
profits, it also destroyed employment opportunities.108 It was suggested,
however, that mechanization would increase productivity and create jobs
in a market directed toward exportation.10'
3. The Decline of the Social Structure
One theme which dominated the more critical positions was the con-
cern that the introduction of a minimum wage would contribute to the
decay of the Zimbabwean social structure. The concern was twofold.
First, over 50 percent of Zimbabwe's population was under the age of
15,110 and many of those juveniles were undereducated.11' Unfortunately,
opportunities for Zimbabwe's young population were already severely lim-
ited. The further strain created by a mandatory minimum wage was felt
certain to add to their anger and frustration. Massive juvenile unemploy-
ment, it was suggested would as a result develop into a major crime
problem." 2
Second, it was feared that the minimum wage would force the ex-
tended family unit, prevalent in the agriculture industry, to dismantle."2
The unit generally included only one wage earner with the other family
members receiving renumeration in kind."4 Because in kind payment of
wages was expressly forbidden by the Act, 6 the unit would be forced to
split up in order to bring in the additional wages necessary. It was also
argued that the domestic servant would vanish as a class. 6 Many of the
fundamental values embraced in these traditions were not going to be
easily relinquished.' 7
106 1 PARL. DEB. (No. 18) 867 (Zimbabwe 1980).
107 1 PARL. DEB. (No. 18) 918 (Zimbabwe 1980).
10 1 PARL. DES. (No. 18) 899 (Zimbabwe 1980).
109 1 PARL. DEB. (No. 18) 938 (Zimbabwe 1980).
110 The Times, supra note 10.
. 1 PARL. DEB. (No. 18) 901 (Zimbabwe 1980).
"2 1 PARL. DEB., supra note 34.
... 1 PARL. DEB. (No. 18) 870 (Zimbabwe 1980).
14 1 PARL. DEB. (No. 18) 949 (Zimbabwe 1980).
11 Minimum Wages Notice § 4(4) (1980) reprinted in Appendix B.
1 PARL. DEB. (No. 18) 906 (Zimbabwe 1980).
"1 1 P~AL. DEB., supra notes 91 and 113.
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B. Disagreement with the Principle
Only a few members of Parliament expressed disagreement with the
principle behind instituting the Minimum Wages Bill. The arguments of
Cronje, Cartwright and Shields followed the basic theme that the Govern-
ment should not interfere with the relationship between employer and
employee. Instead, it was argued, the two groups should be free to negoti-
ate with each other.' It was believed that by directly controlling the em-
ployer, friction would be created between the employee and the Govern-
ment.'1 ' The Government, it was suggested, needed the objectivity that
the unions afforded 20 and that in order to serve the people the unions
must never be put in a position to pit their interests against each other.' 2'
One Member of Parliament suggested that governmental intervention in
an area previously reserved for the employer and employee would deny
the employer "the basic right to be able to tell his own employee what to
do and how much he is going to pay him for it.""'
C. Alternative Proposals
While few were reluctant to express their objections to the Bill, many
neglected to offer an alternative plan. Three members of Parliament who
vehemently opposed the Bill, Cronje, Ndlova and Mobeshora, made sug-
gestions outlining what they considered to be more appropriate relief. Mr.
Cronje emphasized the problem of unemployment and suggested that re-
lief to the unemployed was far more critical than relief to the em-
ployed.'23 He recommended that creation of job opportunities should be
the legislature's primary objective."'
Mr. Ndlova, stating emphatically that "it is not a stop-gap, it is a
prescription for industrial unrest,"'" 5 characterized the Bill as treatment
of the symptom and not the disease.1"6 Reemphasizing the need for creat-
ing employment opportunities through industrial development, he pro-
posed that if the issue were 1) production and 2) people selling their la-
bor, then the important question to be answered would be, "At what
price?' 2 7 He regarded the arbitrary figures represented in the Bill as un-
"'1 PARL. DEB., supra note 2.
119 Id.
1" 1 PARL. DEe. (No. 18) 896 (Zimbabwe 1980).
121 Id.
", 1 PARL. DEB. (No. 18) 919-920 (Zimbabwe 1980).
123 1 PARL. DEE. (No. 18) 880 (Zimbabwe 1980).
124 1 PARL. DEE. (No. 18) 908, 910 (Zimbabwe 1980).
125 1 PARL. DEE. (No. 18) 883 (Zimbabwe 1980).
'11 1 PARL. DEB. (No. 18) 884 (Zimbabwe 1980).
" 1 PARL. DEE. (No. 18) 882 (Zimbabwe 1980).
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responsive '" and suggested that wages should be increased only inasmuch
as they can be justified by correlative increases in profits.1 2 9
Mr. Mobeshora proposed an industry-by-industry assessment of
levels of productivity and a thorough restructuring of wages which would
accurately represent those findings. 80 Tying wages to productivity would
provide an incentive for the laborer to increase his or her output as well
as generate employment opportunities. Mobeshora, however, suggested
that in light of the appalling status of the laborer that the minimum wage
be instituted until other measures of relief could be implemented.3
1
D. The Proponents
In spite of its many drawbacks, the Bill received much support from
Members of Parliament who felt that the laborers' interests were para-
mount due to their acute need for protection against exploitation.1 2
Many perceived the Bill as a useful starting point from which the princi-
ples of supply and demand would coalesce with the traditions of union
negotiations and move toward a logical conclusion. 18
In light of the crisis of expectation, one Member viewed the Bill as a
necessary representation of the Government's idealogical commitment to
raising the quality of life and the prevention of exploitation.1 8' Since
white minority rule had come to an end, the political structure was
changing and it seemed likely that the economic structure would change
as well."85 In the meantime, as that process evolved, Zimbabweans needed
some immediate protection.'3 6 Blacks no longer had to be the victims of
both political and economic oppression. And, because the Members of
Parliament had been elected by those same blacks, it was their obliga-
tions to exert some stabilizing influences over industry and afford their
constituants some economic relief.18 7
E. The Minister's Response
The Minister of Labour & Social Services was the last Member to
speak on the merits of the Bill and he took the opportunity to address
" 1 PARL. DEB. (No. 18) 885 (Zimbabwe 1989).
129 Id.
130 1 PARL. DEB. (No. 18) 910 (Zimbabwe 1980).
'"1 PARL. DEB. (No. 18) 912 (Zimbabwe 1980).
131 See generally, 1 PARL. DEB. (No. 18) (Zimbabwe 1980).
108 1 PARL. DEB. (No. 18) 856-857 (Zimbabwe 1980).
"" 1 PARL. DEB. (No. 18) 922, 931 (Zimbabwe 1980).
'35 1 PARL. DEB., supra note 95.
'36 1 PARL. DEB. (No. 18) 890 (Zimbabwe 1980).
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the objections generally. ' Kangai promised that suffering industries
would be given special attention after the Act went into effect. 3' He
noted that the two-phased introduction process was designed primarily to
give industry time to absorb the shock of higher wages.140
Kangai stated that lists of employers who had terminated employees
in anticipation of the Bill's passage were already being compiled. Al-
though the Bill did not refer to retroactive application, he said these vio-
lators would be punished."' He answered the question about massive un-
employment among women and juveniles by saying that pay rates should
be guided by job descriptions so that whoever takes the job would receive
the same pay rate regardless of race, sex, or age. 4' If the job were too
strenuous for a particular woman or too complex for a particular juvenile,
then they would not get the job or the pay rate. This policy is not consid-
ered to be discrimination, but rather equal pay for equal work.1 43
In response to the suggestion that the minimum wage might break up
the extended family units prevalent in the agricultural industry, Kangai
stated that he found the working conditions which supported the ex-
tended family deplorable. 4 4 He found all family members to be working
for one wage and determining that whatever benefits were received in
kind were certainly insignificant and usually totally inadequate. 145 Kangai
wanted the Government to refuse to be party to that kind of exploitation
despite the effects it might have on the family unit.1 46
F. Analysis
In the preceding sections the opposition predicted egregious results
should the Minimum-Wage Bill become law. These results were only su-
perficially refuted by the Bill's proponents.
Zimbabwe's industrial base had clearly suffered, most notably the ag-
ricultural sector where lay-offs and bankruptcy are bona fide threats to
the victims of such circumstances and where a mandatory minimum wage
is of little use. A depressed industrial sector has an equally depressed
'range of negotiation' in which to compensate for the rising cost of labor.
In most of Zimbabwe's industries, that range is so narrow it appears
nonexistent.
'38 1 PARL. DEB. (No. 18) 940 (Zimbabwe 1980).
139 1 PARL. DEB. (No. 18) 942 (Zimbabwe 1980).
140 1 PARL. DEB. (No. 18) 944 (Zimbabwe 1980).
.4. 1 PARL. DEB. (No. 18) 943 (Zimbabwe 1980).
142 1 PARL. DEB., supra note 114.
143 Id.
144 1 PARL. DEn. (No. 18) 948-949 (Zimbabwe 1980).
'" 1 PARL. DEB. (No. 18) 941 (Zimbabwe 1980).
148 1 PARL. DEB., supra note 146.
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Even if the minimum wage were to deal only a mild blow to industry,
it is contraindicated in a developing country where the most needy are
not the employed but the unemployed. In a nation with so many unem-
ployed, legislative action should aim toward industrial development and
the employment opportunities it would create. Anything which could op-
erate to stifle industrial growth would be counter productive.
The Minister's assurance that the provisions prohibiting discrimina-
tion in wages would guarantee equal pay for equal work glosses over the
fact that 'equal work' is difficult to obtain. The women and juveniles who
do not yet have 'equal work' will not benefit from the 'equal pay'
guarantee.
Any decline in the family structure is probably due to the failure of
the agricultural industry coupled with the urbanization process. The Act,
by giving urban workers higher minimum wages than rural workers, con-
tributes to the urbanization during periods of industrial growth.
V. CURRENT ECONoMIc TRENDS IN CONTEXT
The Minimum Wages Bill came through the committee stage sub-
stantially unchanged14 and was passed on June 20, 1980." 8 It went into
effect, as planned, on July 1, 1980.1" In an attempt to make a meaningful
assessment of its success or failure, the early indications must be identi-
fied and analyzed in the context of the multifaceted environment in
which it was introduced.
A. Identification
While unemployment remains a key problem for the government,
trade and industry reported a 13.9 percent increase in the gross national
product. 50 Real per capita income rose 11 percent and the value of indus-
trial production rose 29 percent."1 With the first comprehensive account-
ing of trade figures published since UDI, exports increased significantly
more than imports resulting in a healthy balance of payments."9 2
Once the Government sanctions were lifted, farmers were encouraged
to cultivate maize and Zimbabwe experienced an unexpected maize sur-
plus."" Although the surplus allowed for much needed import substitu-
tion, the significance of the surplus is that it revived the agricultural sec-
117 1 PARL. DEB. (No. 18) 951-956 (Zimbabwe 1980).
"8 1 PARL. DEB. (No. 18) 000 (Zimbabwe 1980).
" See Gazette, supra note 1.
16 WORLD BUSINESS WEEKLY, Sept. 7, 1981, at 14.
"' Id.
162 The Times (London), Oct. 10, 1980, at 9, col. 1.
,63 The Times, supra note 19.
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tor. Trade unions have been reorganized'5" and the use of workers'
committees has mushroomed to the point where even domestic workers
are organized.1 55 In late 1980, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe announced
that Zimbabwe's real domestic product growth in 1980 was expected to
reach five percent despite zero growth in 1979.156
B. Discussion
Out of context, the early indications appear to be favorable. The acid
test, however, is whether the same indication appears as a result of the
Minimum Wages Act or in spite of it. The following comparison serves to
illustrate the fact that it is more likely the latter.
The Ivory Coast is an African nation which is similar to Zimbabwe in
many significant respects. It was colonized by a European nation (France)
in the 18th century and gain independence in 1960.157 Industrial activity
focuses mainly on natural resource based exports such as agricultural and
mining products.15 ' The structure of the working class is strongly race-
linked, the unskilled sector being comprised mostly of blacks.15 '
For all the similarities between the Ivory Coast and Zimbabwe, the
former, unlike the latter, is a prosperous nation. 1 0 This distinction is
largely accounted for by the fact that Zimbabwe, unlike the Ivory Coast,
has a large surplus of labor.16" In addition, the Ivory Coast's trade, devel-
opment, and employment policies are directed toward the export of labor-
intensive commodities. The market is relatively free from governmental
intervention in an effort to encourage the influx of foreign capital.'"
Industry in the Ivory Coast, as in Zimbabwe, operates under mini-
mum wage legislation. In 1972, it was determined that the minimum wage
was having an adverse effect on the nation's export-oriented policy. The
minimum wage was found to be effective only at the unskilled level,'"
and encouraged industry to substitute skilled for unskilled labor.'" Be-
cause natural resource based products concentrated on the utilization of
unskilled labor, the impact of the underutilization of unskilled labor was
154 The Times (London), Nov. 15, 1980, at 5, col. 2.
15 Id.
156 The Times (London), Nov. 10, 1980, at 15, col. 1.
"5 KRUEGER, LARY, MONSON, AND ALCRASANEE, TRADE AND EMPLOYMENT IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 239 (1981).
158 Id.
159 Id. at 249.
160 Id. at 239.
161 Id.
16 Id. at 266.
Id. at 273.
164 Id. at 239.
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felt largely in the export market.' 65 According to this data, the minimum
wage legislation was identified as an impediment in An otherwise thriving
economy.'" Presumedly, this effect would be even more pronounced in
Zimbabwe, where surplus labor and rising unemployment places an addi-
tional burden on the economy.
According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment (OECD), among developing nations such as Zimbabwe, there are
five factors which indicate economic instability: 1) growth in the labor
force, 2) changes in the structure of the labor force, 3) unemployment, 4)
urbanization and 5) trends in income distribution.',' All five considera-
tions center on the problem of employment. The OECD suggested that
given the continued growth of the world's labor force, the solution would
be to shift the remedial emphasis from trying to inject technology into
existing industries to instead finding productive ways to absorb the un-
employed into the labor force.1" Simply put, minimum wages attract
more labor than can be absorbed and add to unemployment. An
overburdened and underdeveloped economy does not have the cushion
provided by the Ivory Coast's otherwise stable economy to absorb the
consequent shock.
VI. CONCLUSION
If Zimbabwe's economy had not appeared to be stabilizing, the Mini-
mum Wages Act would never have been suggested as a possible cause of
that stabilization. However, if the Act was not a contributing cause, what
was?
On June 28, 1976, the United Nations Committee for Trade and De-
velopment (UNCTAD) resolved to take special measures to give aid to
least developed countries (LDCs),' 69 located largely in Central Africa. The
LDCs were to receive more direct aid and more technical assistance.'
7 0
Official debts with member nations were to be considered for cancellation.
The LDCs were accorded special consideration in: commodity agree-
ments, the establishment of processing industries and multilateral trade
transactions.' 7 ' In an effort to render aid to LDCs, UNCTAD sought to
foster an international atmosphere which would facilitate foreign trade
Id. at 274.
'" Id. at 266.
', D. TURNHAM, THE EMPLOYMENT PROBLEM IN LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES: A REVIEW
OF EVIDENCE 121 (1971).
18 Id. at 9.
169 UNCTAD TD/191 (1976); UNCTAD Resolution 98 (iv) (June 28, 1976).
110 A. MACBEAN, A POSITIVE APPROACH TO THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 45
(1978).
171 Id.
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relations and allow LDCs to take advantage of export earnings, thereby
improving domestic stability.1 7 2 Domestic stability would, in turn, foster
internal growth planning and aid industrial development. 7 2 It was this
policy which helped create the atmosphere in which Zimbabwe, through
the exploitation of exportation opportunities, was able to achieve eco-
nomic gains which, as predicted by UNCTAD, were realized in terms of
domestic growth.1
7 4
Once the sanctions were lifted, costs in agricultural production were
reduced and natural export markets opened up. Producers were able to
realize a substantially higher net return. The increase in profits provided
producers with the wage increases required by the Act. And, the higher
wage created an increased consumer demand and stimulated the econ-
omy. It appears that the Minimum Wages Act and an economic fortuity
(the removal of sanctions and the consequent opportunity for export ex-
pansion) have cooperated to bring about the effect desired. It is doubtful,
however, that the Act could have achieved the same result by itself.
In summary, economic problems are not isolated occurrences within
the borders of a nation which conducts international trade. Governmental
intervention into domestic economic affairs should be designed to ac-
comodate internal as well as external factors. Although it does not appear
that the Minimum Wages Act has done any of the damage it was feared it
would do to Zimbabwe's economy, the much improved economy is most
likely due to non-legislated external factors. The expanding opportunities
in exportation and import substitution brought about by the inter-
national recognition of Zimbabwe in the areas of foreign aid and trade
relations have been and should continue to be vigorously pursued.
172 Id.
17 Id. at 15.
174 Id. at 26.
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Appendix A
ZIMBABWE
ACT
To make provision for the fixing, enforcement and collection of a
minimum wage; to prohibit discrimination in the payment of
wages; and to provide for matters incidental to or connected
with the foregoing.
ENACTED by the President and the Parliament of Zimbabwe.
1. This Act may be cited as the Minimum Wages Act, 1980.
2. In this Act-
"employer" means any person employed by or working for any
employer and receiving, or being entitled to receive, any
remuneration in respect of such employment or work;
"employer" means any person whatsoever who employs or
provides work for any person and remunerates or expressly or
tacitly undertakes to remunerate him, and includes the
manager, agent or representative of such first-mentioned
person who is in charge or control of the work upon which
such second-mentioned person is employed;
"minimum wage notice" means a notice made in terms of section
three;
"Minister" means the Minister of Labour and Social Services or
such other Minister to whom the President may from time to
time assign the administration of this Act;
"specified person" means a person specified by the court in terms
of paragraph (b) of subsection (2) of section six.
3. The Minister may, by notice in the Gazette-
(a) direct the payment of such minimum wages to such class of
employees as may be specified in the notice without any
discrimination on the grounds of race, sex or age;
(b) regulate or prohibit the making of deductions from the wages
of an employee to whom the notice relates;
(c) regulate or prohibit the withdrawal, reduction or alteration of
any benefits which an employee to whom the notice relates
was entitled to in respect of his employment immediately
before the date of commencement of such notice;
1981
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(d) give such other direction or make such other provision as he
may deem necessary or desirable to ensure the payment of a
minimum wage to any class of employee.
4. (1) The Minister may appoint one or more boards consisting of
such persons as he deems fit to investigate and make recommendations to
him as to the fixing of minimum wages for employees and as to any other
matters to which a minimum wage notice may relate.
e (2) The Minister may appoint a board in terms of subsection (1)
either on his own volition or upon the recommendation of any employer
or employee or of any organization, body or association representing
employers or employees.
5. Where the Minister has made a minimum wage notice-
(a) no employer shall contravene any provision of such minimum
wage notice;
(b) every contract and every agreement, determination or
regulation made in terms of any enactment relating to the
employment of an employee to whom such minimum wage
notice relates shall be construed with such modifications,
qualifications, adaptations and exceptions as may be
necessary to bring it into conformity with such notice;
(c) every agreement or arrangement of any kind whatsoever,
express or implied, whether made before or after the date of
commencement of such minimum wage notice, by an employer
or employee to whom such notice relates, which conflicts with
such notice, shall, to the extent of such conflict, be of no force
or effect.
6. (1) Any employer who contravenes the provisions of paragraph
(a) of section five shall be guilty of an offence and liable to a fine not
exceeding one thousand dollars or to imprisonment for a period not
exceeding three months or to both such fine and such imprisonment.
(2) The court convicting an employer of an offence in terms of
subsection (1) may order him to pay-
(a) to the employee concerned; or
(b) to any person specified by the court for the benefit of the
employee concerned;
in addition to any other penalty which it may impose, an amount not
exceeding such amount by which the court considers the employee
concerned has been prejudiced as a result of the contravention concerned,
within such period and is such instalments or otherwise as may be fixed
by the court.
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(3) The court may at any time, on the application of the
employer, employee or specified person concerned, for good cause shown,
vary an order made in terms of subsection (2).
(4) The provisions of sections 324 and 325 of the Criminal
Procedure and Evidence Act [Chapter 59] shall, mutatis mutandis, apply
in relation to the amount specified in an order made in terms of
subsection (2) as if such amount were a fine referred to in those sections.
(5) Nothing in this section contained shall be construed as
precluding an employee, in the absence of any order made in terms of
subsection (2), from recovering by civil proceedings any amount by which
he has been prejudiced as a result of any contravention of a minimum
wage notice.
7. (1) No employer shall, otherwise than in terms of an exemption
granted to him in terms of subsection (2), terminate the services of an
employee solely on the ground of a requirement to pay him a minimum
wage in terms of a minimum wage notice.
(2) Where the Minister considers that special circumstances exist,
he may, by notice in writing and on such terms and conditions as he may
specify, grant an employer exemption from the provisions of subsection(1).
(3) Any person who contravenes the provisions of subsection (1)
shall be guilty of an offence and liable to a fine not exceeding one
thousand dollars or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding three
months or to both such fine and such imprisonment.
8. (1) Notwithstanding the provisions of any contract or of any
agreement, determination or regulation made in terms of any enactment
relating to the employment of an employee, no employer shall
discriminate in the payment of wages to an employee on the grounds of
race, sex or age and every such contract, agreement, determination or
regulation which provides to the contrary shall, to such extent, be of no
force or effect.
(2) Any person who contravenes the provisions of subsection (1)
shall be guilty of an offence and liable to a fine not exceeding one
thousand dollars or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding three
months or to both such fine and such imprisonment.
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Appendix B
Minimum Wages (Specification of Minimum Wages) Notice, 1980
THE Minister of Labour and Social Services hereby, in terms of
section 3 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1980, makes the following notice:-
Title and date of commencement
1. (1) This notice may be cited as the Minimum Wages
(Specification of Minimum Wages) Notice, 1980.
(2) This notice shall come into operation on the 1st July, 1980.
Application
2. This notice shall not apply to-
(a) independent contractors; or
(b) contract-workers; or
(c) special workers;
except in so far as they may be employers of scheduled employees.
Interpretation of terms
3. In this notice-
"agricultural employee" means a person employed in-
(a) the commercial production of crops, including commercial
forestry, horticulture and viticulture; or
(b) the commercial raising of animals or birds, including
livestock, game and poultry; or
(c) commercial fishing; or
(d) the processing, on the land where they are produced, of the
products of the activities specified in paragraph (a), (b) or
(c);
"casual employee" means an employee, other than a part-time
employee, whose engagement is for a period of not more than
six weeks in any three calendar months;
"contract-worker" means an employee who is employed
exclusively on piece-work the rates for which have been
negotiated directly with his employer;
"industrial enactment" means an agreement, determination or
employment regulations in force in terms of the Industrial
Conciliation Act [Chapter 267];
"mining employee" means a person employed in-
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(a) the extraction from the earth or its surface of any mineral
as defined in the Mines and Minerals Act [Chapter 165]; or
(b) the beneficiation or other processing of ores for the purpose
of producing minerals as defined in the Mines and Minerals
Act [Chapter 165]; or
(c) the extraction or manufacture of by-products from coal:
but does not include a person employed solely in the
beneficiation or processing of ore for the production of-
(i) pig-iron or steel; or
(ii) ferro-alloys, unless such ferro-alloys are produced on a
mining location or within the area of a special grant as
defined in the Mines and Minerals Act [Chapter 165];
"part-time employee" means an employee who is engaged by any
one employer to take regular daily work for periods not
exceeding a total of five hours a day, or engaged on a weekly
basis of not more than thirty hours a week;
"scheduled employee" means an employee of a class specified in
the first column of the Schedule;
"special worker" means an employee who, because of physical or
mental disability or infirmity, is capable of doing only part of
the work required of an able-bodied employee;
"sawmilling employee" means a person employed at a sawmill
situated on or adjacent to the land where the timber which is
processed at the sawmill is grown;
"sugar-production employee" means a person employed in the
extraction of sugar or ethanol from sugar-cane at an extraction
plant situated on or adjacent to the land where the sugar-cane
is grown;
"welfare organization" means a welfare organization as defined in
section 2 of the Welfare Organizations Act [Chapter 93].
Payment of minimum wages
4. (1) Subject to the provisions of this notice, every employer of a
scheduled employee shall pay that employee not less than-
(a) in respect of any period of employment from the 1st July,
1980, to the 31st December, 1980, the minimum wage
specified opposite the class of that scheduled employee in the
second column of the Schedule;
(b) in respect of any period of employment after the 31st
December, 1980, the minimum wage specified opposite the
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class of that scheduled employee in the third column of the
Schedule.
(2) A scheduled employee who is a part-time employee shall be
paid, for each hour worked, not less than one hundred and ninety-fifth
part of the minimum wage specified in the second or, as the case may be,
the third column of the Schedule opposite the class of that scheduled
employee.
(3) A scheduled employee who is a casual employee shall be paid
for each day worked-
(a) in a five-day week, not less than one twenty-second part;
(b) in a six-day week, not less than one twenty-sixth part;
of a minimum wage specified in the second or, as the case may be, the
third column of the Schedule opposite the class of that scheduled
employee.
(4) No part of the wages payable in terms of this notice shall be
paid in kind.
Deductions
5. No employer of a scheduled employee who is being paid the
minimum wage in terms of this notice shall deduct or set off any amount
from the wages of such employee, except-
(a) in the case of an employee to whom the provisions of any
industrial enactment apply, an amount of which may be
lawfully deducted or set off in terms of that industrial
enactment;
(b) in the case of any other employee-
(i) where the employee is absent from work without the leave
of his employer, a pro rata amount of his wage for the
period of such absence; or
(ii) by a written stop-order, contributions to holiday,
benevolent, provident, pension or sick-benefit funds,
medical-aid societies or insurance policies; or
(iii) with the consent of the employee, any amount in respect of
money owing for goods supplied or services rendered to the
employee by the employer, or for the repayment of money
lent to the employee by the employer; or
(iv) any amount which the employer is compelled by law or
legal process to pay on behalf of the employee; or
(v) any amount recovered for payments made in error or over-
payment of wages.
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Withdrawal, reduction or alteration of benefits
6. Except with the consent of the Minister, no employer of a
scheduled employee shall, on account of the promulgation of this notice,
withdraw, reduce or alter any benefit which that employee was entitled to
receive in respect of his employment immediately before the 1st July,
1980, if the amount calculated by subtracting-
(a) in the case of withdrawal, the monthly value of that benefit;
or
(b) in the case of a reduction or alteration, the difference between
the monthly value of that benefit before its reduction or
alteration and its monthly value afterwards;
from the monthly wage received by that employee is less than the for that
class of scheduled employee.
Discrimination
7. The minimum wages prescribed by this notice shall be paid to
scheduled employees without discrimination on the grounds of race, sex
or age.
Conversion or rates
8. (1) For the purpose of ascertaining the minimum wage to be paid
to-
(a) a fornightly paid employee, the minimum wage specified in
the Schedule as appropriate to that employee shall be divided
by two and one-sixth;
(b) a weekly paid employee, the minimum wage specified in the
Schedule as appropriate to that employee shall be divided by
four and one-third;
(c) a daily paid employee, the minimum wage specified in the
Schedule as appropriate to that employee shall be divided
by-
(i) twenty-two, in the case of employees who work a five-day
week;
(ii) twenty-six, in the case of employees who work a six-day
week;
(d) an hourly paid employee, the weekly wage calculated in terms
of paragraph (b) shall be divided by the number of hours
normally worked in a week.
(2) A scheduled employee whose wages are paid in accordance
with this section shall be deemed to be receiving the minimum monthly
wage specified in the Schedule as appropriate to his class.
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SCHEDULE (Sections 4, 5, 6 and 7)
MINIMUM WAGES
Minimum monthly Minimum monthly
wage: up to wage: after
31.12.80 31.12.80$ $
1. Persons employed by welfare
organizations as domestic
employees 30 30
2. Persons employed in domestic
service in private households or
on land attached thereto 30 30
3. Agricultural employees other
than sawmilling employees or
sugar-production employees 30 30
4. Persons, other than persons
specified elsewhere in this
Schedule, who are employed
wholly or mainly in a rural
council area outside the
designated area thereof 30 30
5. Mining employees 43 58
6. Sugar-production employees
and sawmilling employees 70 85
7. Persons, other than persons
specified in paragraph 3, 5 10
or 11, to whom the provisions
of any industrial enactment
apply 70 85
8. Persons, other than persons
specified in paragraph 3, 5, 6 or
7, who are employed wholly or
mainly in a rural council area
outside the designated area
thereof, and to whom the
provisions of an industrial
enactment would apply if they
were employed by their
employers within the area of
application of that industrial
enactment 70 85
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Minimum monthly
wage: up to
31.12.80
$
9. Persons, other than persons
specified in paragraph 1, 2, 3, 5,
6, 7, 10 or 11, who are
employed within-
(a) the area of any municipality
or town; or
(b) the designated area of any
rural council; or
(c) any area which, on the 1st
July, 1980, was a local
government area adminis-
tered by a municipal
council town council or
local board; or
(d) any of the following areas
which, on the 1st July,
1980, were local government
areas administered by rural
councils-
(i) Chipadze;
(ii) Chivu;
(iii) Chukangwe;
(iv) Dingumuzi;
(v) Dulibadzimo;
(vi) Gaza;
(vii) Jahunda;
(viii) Kuwadzana;
(ix) Mandava;
(x) Ngoni;
(xi) Tshovani;
(xii) Vengere
10. Persons to whom the provisions
of the Building Industry
Employment Regulations, 1976,
published in Rhodesia
Government Notice 153 of
1976, apply
11. Persons to whom the provisions
of the Civil Engineering
Industry Employment
Regulations, 1977, published in
Rhodesia Government Notice
469 of 1977, apply
70
The minimum
monthly wage
payable to the
employee
concerned in
terms of the
said regulations,
plus $9,23
The minimum
monthly wage
payable to the
employee
concerned in
terms of the
said regulations,
plus $25,75
Minimum monthly
wage: after
31.12.80
85
The minimum
monthly wage
payable to the
employee
concerned in
terms of the
said regulations,
plus $24,23
The minimum
monthly wage
payable to the
employee
concerned in
terms of the
said regulations,
plus $40,75".

